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Abstract
We discuss four solution concepts for games with incomplete information. We show how
each solution concept can be viewed as encoding informational robustness. For a given
type space, we consider expansions of the type space that provide players with additional
signals. We distinguish between expansions along two dimensions. First, the signals can
either convey payo¤ relevant information or only payo¤ irrelevant information. Second, the
signals can be generated from a common (prior) distribution or not.

We establish the

equivalence between Bayes Nash equilibrium behavior under the resulting expansion of the
type space and a corresponding more permissive solution concept under the original type
space.

This approach uni…es some existing literature and, in the case of an expansion

without a common prior and allowing for payo¤ relevant signals, leads us to a new solution
concept that we dub belief-free rationalizability.
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Introduction

Classical analysis of incomplete information games treats the information structure of the players
as given, and examines the consequences of some theory of rational behavior (i.e., solution concept) given that information structure. But the exact information structure is often not known
to the analyst, and thus it is interesting to examine the implications of that solution concept
in all information structures that the analyst thinks possible, and thus identify predictions that
are robust to informational assumptions. In earlier work, we have examined such informational
robustness questions both in the context of mechanism design (Bergemann and Morris (2012))
and in the context of general games (Bergemann and Morris (2014)).
There is a close connection between relaxing informational assumptions and relaxing solution
concepts. Consider the solution concept of Nash equilibrium in a complete information game.
Suppose that we allow players to observe arbitrary (payo¤-irrelevant) signals. If the common
prior assumption is maintained, then Aumann (1987) showed that distribution of equilibrium
behavior would correspond to an (objective) correlated equilibrium. Without the common prior
assumption, Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and Tan and Werlang (1988) showed that all one
can say about the resulting equilibrium behavior is that each player will choose a (correlated)
rationalizable action.
What are the incomplete information analogues of these results? Suppose now that payo¤s
depend on a "payo¤ state" and players’ beliefs and higher-order beliefs about that state are
described by a type space. But suppose that players may also observe payo¤-irrelevant signals
that do not change their beliefs and higher-order beliefs about the state. Incomplete information
analogues of the complete information results are known in this setting. If the common prior
assumption is maintained, and we study (Bayes Nash) equilibria on the expanded type space with
payo¤-irrelevant signals, then the distribution of equilibrium behavior corresponds to a belief
invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium (Liu (2014)).

Without the common prior assumption,

all one can say about the resulting equilibrium behavior is that players will choose interim
correlated rationalizable actions (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006)). Alternative extensions
of the complete information results to incomplete information arise if we allow players to observe
payo¤ relevant signals, i.e., signals that re…ne their initial beliefs and higher-order beliefs about
the state.

If the common prior assumption is maintained, and we study equilibria on the

expanded type space with payo¤-relevant signals, then the distribution of equilibrium behavior
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corresponds to a Bayes correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris (2014)).
This summary of existing incomplete information results leaves one open question: what is
the implication of allowing players to observe additional payo¤ relevant signals without imposing
the common prior assumption? One contribution of this paper is describe a solution concept
- belief-free rationalizability - and show that an action can be played in equilibrium by a given
type who may observe extra payo¤ relevant signals if and only if it is belief-free rationalizable.1
Belief-free rationalizability is de…ned by the following iterative process that uses only the support
of a type’s beliefs, i.e., the set of pro…les of other players’types and states that he thinks possible.
At each round, we delete an action for a particular type if there is no conjecture over pro…les of
other players’actions and states, such that the action is a best response to the conjecture; and
the conjecture assigns zero probability to (1) pro…les of the other players’actions and types that
have already been deleted; and (2) pro…les of other players’types and states that are not in the
support of his original beliefs.
The following table summarizes the consequences of equilibrium under incomplete information
if we allow players to observe additional signals that may or may not be consistent with the
common prior and may or may not be payo¤ relevant:
payo¤ relevant signals
common prior

payo¤-irrelevant signals only

Bayes correlated equilibrium belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium

non common prior belief-free rationalizability

interim correlated rationalizability

In the special case of complete information (i.e., a unique payo¤ state), both rationalizability
results reduce to the result of Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and both correlated equilibrium
results reduce to the result of Aumann (1987).
We report one example to illustrate belief-free rationalizability. Consider a two player two
action game where each player must decide whether to invest or not.

There is a bad state

where it is a dominant strategy for both players to not invest. But there is also a good state
where invest is a best response for a player only if he assigns at least probability p to the other
player investing. Investment is interim correlated rationalizable in this example only if there is
common p-belief that the state is good. This also implies that the largest belief invariant Bayes
correlated equilibrium has both players investing only when there is common p-belief that the
state is good. We give a parallel characterization for belief-free rationalizability. A necessary
1

We discuss the relation to the use of this name in Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo, and Penta (2011) below.
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condition for investment will be that a player thinks that it is possible that the state is good.
Another necessary condition is that a player thinks it is possible that the other player thinks
that it is possible that the state is good. And so on. Thus a necessary - and, one can also show,
su¢ cient - condition for investment to be belief-free rationalizable is that there is "common
possibility" that the state is good, in the sense that all in…nite sequences of such statements
are true.

For an insightful equivalent characterization, say that there is iterated distributed

certainty of an event if someone is sure that the event is true, or someone is sure that someone
else is sure that the event is true, or some iteration of this statement is true. One can also show
that invest is belief-free rationalizable if and only if there is not distributed iterated certainty
that the state is bad.
All these solution concepts have simpler statements and interpretations in the special case
of "payo¤ type" environments, where we assume the payo¤ state can be represented as a pro…le
of player speci…c "payo¤ types", and each player is certain of his own payo¤ type. The payo¤
type assumption corresponds to the assumption that there is "distributed certainty," i.e., the join
of players’information reveals the true state; the assumption is not without loss of generality.
But under this assumption, the "correlation" in interim correlation rationalizability is no longer
relevant, and it is equivalent to interim independent rationalizability; the belief invariant Bayes
correlated equilibrium reduces to the belief invariant Bayesian solution of Forges (2006) and
Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010); and Bayes correlated equilibrium reduces to the Bayesian
solution of Forges (1993).
Much of the literature - for one reason or another - focusses on the special case of "payo¤ type"
environments. This assumption is implicit in much of the literature on incomplete information
correlated equilibrium, e.g., in the solution concepts and papers cited in the previous paragraph.
A leading example of a payo¤ type environment is a private values environment (where a player’s
payo¤ depends only on his own payo¤ type), and Chen, Micali, and Pass (2014b) have proposed
what we are calling belief-free rationalizability in this context and used it for novel results on
robust revenue maximization in Chen, Micali, and Pass (2014a).

Payo¤ type environments

without private values were the focus of earlier work of ours on robust mechanism design collected
in Bergemann and Morris (2012). In that work, we considered the special case where all players
believed that all payo¤ type pro…les of other players were possible. In this special case, belieffree rationalizability has a particularly simple characterization. For each payo¤ type, iteratively
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delete actions for that payo¤ type which are not a best response against any conjecture over
others players’actions and types that have survived the iterated deletion procedure so far. This
solution concept (with appropriate informational robustness foundations) was used in a number
of our papers on robust mechanism design (i.e., chapters 3, 4 and 7 of Bergemann and Morris
(2012)).

Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo, and Penta (2011) labelled this solution concept "belief-

free rationalizability". We used Bayes correlated equilibrium (in the special case of payo¤ type
environments) in Bergemann and Morris (2008) (chapter 5 in Bergemann and Morris (2012)).2
A second contribution of this paper is then to tightly relate our earlier work on robust mechanism
design to our more recent work on robust predictions in games (Bergemann and Morris (2013),
(2014)).
Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003b) introduced the notion of " -rationalizability" for both
complete and incomplete information environments, building in arbitrary restrictions on the
beliefs of any type about other players’types and actions, and states. Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo,
and Penta (2011) describes how interim correlated rationalizability (in general) and belief-free
rationalizability (in the case of payo¤ type spaces) are special cases of " -rationalizability", where
particular restrictions are placed on beliefs about other players’ types and states.
rationalizability will also be a special case of

Belief-free

-rationalizability, outside payo¤ type environments,

where the corresponding type dependent restriction on beliefs would be on the support of beliefs
only.
We framed the complete information results of Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and Aumann
(1987) as "informational robustness" results, i.e., what happens to equilibrium predictions if we
allow players to observe additional (payo¤-irrelevant) signals, and this corresponds to the formal
statements of their results.3 However, both papers interpret their results informally as establishing the implications of common certainty of rationality,4 and the later "epistemic foundations"
2

Thus the application of the solution concepts in the results in this paper to payo¤ type environments subsumes

results we reported in our unpublished paper on "Belief Free Incomplete Information Games" (Bergemann and
Morris (2007)).
3
Thus Proposition 2.1 of Brandenburger and Dekel (1987), while stated in the language of interim payo¤s,
established that the set of actions played in an appropriate version of subjective correlated equilibrium were equal
to the correlated rationalizable actions. The main theorem of Aumann (1987) showed that under assumptions
equivalent to Bayes Nash equilibrium on a common prior type space with payo¤-irrelevant signals, the ex ante
distribution of play corresponds to an (objective) correlated equilibrium.
4
Aumann (1987) notes in the introduction that he assumes "common knowledge that each player chooses a
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literature presents more formal statements of these results as consequence of common certainty of
rationality.5 We also discuss how our "informational robustness" results can be translated back
into "epistemic foundations" results, justifying solution concepts from primitive epistemic assumptions. However, our epistemic foundations results are in the spirit of the classical literature
and we do not address issues that have been the focus of much recent literature, i.e., removing reference to players’beliefs about their own types (Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)), restricting
attention to state spaces that re‡ect "expressible" statements about the model (Brandenburger
and Friedenberg (2008) and Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo, and Penta (2011)), and giving an interim interpretation of the common prior results (Dekel and Siniscalchi (2014)). The focus of
our discussion of epistemic foundations is showing how the informational robustness results we
discuss map into the modern epistemic foundations literature, without attempting a treatment
of the topics of interest in that literature.
We discuss the four solution concepts in section 2 and the coordination example in section 3.
In section 4, we report how the solution concepts specialize to complete information rationalizability and correlated equilibrium in the case of complete information games, and widely used
and simpler solution concepts in the case of payo¤ type environments. Informational robustness
foundations of the solution concepts are reported in section 5; their translation to (old fashioned)
epistemic foundation results and their relation to the (modern) epistemic foundations literature
are discussed in section 6.

strategy that maximizes his expected utility given his information". Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) write in
the introduction that their approach "starts from the assumption that the rationality of the players is common
knowledge." We follow the recent literature in replacing the term "knowledge" in the expression common knowledge because it corresponds to "belief with probability 1," rather than "true belief" (the meaning of knowledge
in philosophy and general discourse). We use "certainty" to mean "belief with probability 1".
5
Thus Dekel and Siniscalchi (2014) state a modern version of the main result of Brandenburger and Dekel
(1987) as Theorem 1 and a (somewhat) more modern statement of Aumann (1987) in section 4.6.2.
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Four Classical Solution Concepts

We will …x a …nite set of players 1; :::; I and a …nite set of payo¤ relevant states

.

We divide a standard description of an incomplete information game into a "basic game" and
a "type space". A basic game G = (Ai ; ui )Ii=1 consists of, for each player, a …nite set of possible
actions Ai and a payo¤ function ui : A
T = (Ti ;

I
i )i=1

! R where A = A1

AI .6

:::

A type space

consists of, for each player, a …nite set of types, Ti and, for each of his types,

a belief over the others players’ types and the state,
information game consists of a basic game G

i

= (Ai ; ui )Ii=1

: Ti !

(T

).

i

An incomplete

and a type space T = (Ti ;

I
i )i=1 ;

this

is the standard description modulo the fact that the common prior assumption is not maintained.
We begin by discussing "classical solution concepts" for the …xed incomplete information game
(G; T ), meaning that we de…ne solution concepts without referring to informational robustness
(or epistemic) foundations.
We consider two alternative de…nitions of rationalizability in game (G; T ).

First consider

interim correlated rationalizability (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007)). An action is interim
correlated rationalizable for a type ti if we iteratively delete actions which are not a best response
to any supporting conjecture over other players’actions and types, as well as states, which (1)
puts probability 1 on action type pro…les which have survived the iterated deletion procedure
so far, and (2) has a marginal belief over others’types and states which is consistent with that
type’s beliefs on the type space.

Crucially, this de…nition allows arbitrary correlation in the

supporting conjecture as long as (1) and (2) are satis…ed. Formally, let ICRi0 (ti ) = Ai and let
ICRin+1 (ti ) equal the set of actions for which there exists

i

2

(A

i

T

i

) such that

(a i ; t i ; ) > 0 ) aj 2 ICRjn (tj ) for each j 6= i;
X
(2)
i (a i ; t i ; ) = i (t i ; jti ) for each t i ; ;
(1)

i

a

i

(3) ai 2 arg max
a0i

a

X

i

(a i ; t i ; ) ui ((a0i ; a i ) ; ) ;

i ;t i ;

and let
ICRi (ti ) =

\

ICRin (ti ) .

n 1
6

In Bergemann and Morris (2014) we included a common prior on states in the description of the basic game.

Because we are relaxing the common prior assumption, it is convenient to use a slightly di¤erent de…nition in this
paper.
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De…nition 1 (Interim Correlated Rationalizable)
Action ai is interim correlated rationalizable for type ti (in game (G; T )) if ai 2 ICRi (ti ).
Now consider a more permissive rationalizability notion, belief-free rationalizability.

The

de…nition is the same as iterated correlated rationalizability except that we relax assumption (2)
to the requirement that the rationalizing conjecture be consistent with the player’s belief on the
type space to the weaker requirement that its support is a subset of the player’s belief on the
type space. Thus we have BF Ri0 (ti ) = Ai and let BF Rin+1 (ti ) equal the set of actions for which
there exists

i

2

(T

A

i

) s.t.

i

(a i ; t i ; ) > 0 ) aj 2 BF Rjn (tj ) for each j 6= i;
X
(2)
i (a i ; t i ; ) > 0 ) i (t i ; jti ) > 0 for each t i ; ;
(1)

i

a

i

(3) ai 2 arg max
a0i

a

X

i

(a i ; t i ; ) ui ((a0i ; a i ) ; ) ;

i ;t i ;

and let
BF Ri (ti ) =

\

BF Rin (ti ) .

n 1

De…nition 2 (Belief-Free Rationalizable)
Action ai is belief-free rationalizable for type ti (in game (G; T )) if ai 2 BF Ri (ti ).
Note that this de…nition is independent of a type’s quantized beliefs and depends only on
which pro…les of other players’ types and states he considers possible, i.e., the support of his
beliefs.
We now consider two parallel de…nitions of (objective) incomplete information correlated
equilibrium for the same incomplete information game. Type space T = (Ti ;
common prior assumption if there exists
X

t0 i ;

2

) such that

(T

ti ; t0

i

;

0

>0

0

for all i and ti , and
i

(t i ; jti ) = X
t0 i ;

0

((ti ; t i ) ; )
ti ; t0

i

;

0

I
i )i=1

satis…es the
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for all i, (ti ; t i ) and .7
Now we have a common prior incomplete information game (G; T ). Behavior in this incomplete information game can be described by a decision rule mapping players’types and states to
a probability distribution over players’actions,

:T

!

(A). A decision rule

satis…es

belief invariance if, for each player i,
i

(ai j (ti ; t i ) ; ) ,

is independent of (t i ; ).

X
a

i

i

((ai ; a i ) j (ti ; t i ) ; )

Thus a decision rule satis…es belief invariance if a player’s action

recommendation does not reveal any additional information to him about others’types and the
state.

This property has played an important role in the literature on incomplete information

correlated equilibrium, see, Forges (1993), Forges (2006) and Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya
(2010). Notice that property (2) in the iterative de…nition of interim correlated rationalizability
was a belief invariance assumption.
Decision rule

satis…es obedience if

a

a

X
i ;t

i;

X

i ;t i ;

(ti ; t i ) ((ai ; a i ) j (ti ; t i ) ; ) ui ((ai ; a i ) ; )
(ti ; t i ) ((ai ; a i ) j (ti ; t i ) ; ) ui ((a0i ; a i ) ; ) .

for all i, ti 2 Ti and ai ; a0i 2 Ai . Obedience has the following mediator interpretation. Suppose
that an omniscient mediator knew players’types and the true state, randomly selected an action
pro…le according to

and privately informed each player of his recommended action. Would a

player who knew his own type and heard the mediator’s recommendation have an incentive to
follow the recommendation? Obedience says that he would want to follow the recommendation.
De…nition 3 (Belief Invariant Bayes Correlated Equilibrium)
Decision rule

is a belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium if it satis…es obedience and belief

invariance.
7

When the common prior assumption is maintained, we understand the common prior

de…ned by the type space.

to be implicitly

In the (special) case where multiple common priors satisfy the above properties,

our results will hold true for any choice of common prior.

By requiring that all types are assigned positive

probability, we are making a slightly stronger assumption than some formulations of results in the literature.
This version simpli…es the statement of results and will also tie in with the support assumption that we impose
in the informational robustness foundations in Section 5.
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Liu (2014) described the subjective correlated equilibrium analogue of interim correlated
rationalizability. If one then imposes the common prior assumption (as he discusses in section
5.3), this is the version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium one obtains. Its relation
to the incomplete information correlated equilibrium literature is further discussed in Bergemann
and Morris (2014): it is in general a weaker requirement than the belief invariant Bayesian
solution of Forges (2006) and Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010), because - like interim
correlated rationalizability - it allows unexplained correlation between types and payo¤ states.
It is immediate from de…nitions that any action played with positive probability by a type in a
belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium is interim correlated rationalizable.
De…nition 4 (Bayes Correlated Equilibrium)
Decision rule

is a Bayes correlated equilibrium if it satis…es obedience.

This solution concept is studied in Bergemann and Morris (2014).

It is immediate from

de…nitions that any action played with positive probability by a type in a belief invariant Bayes
correlated equilibrium is belief-free rationalizable.

3

Binary Action Coordination Games

The solution concepts can be illustrated by a classic binary action coordination game. There
are two states, "good" (G) and "bad" (B), so

=f

G ; B g.

There are two actions, Invest and

Not Invest. Payo¤s are given by the following matrices:
B

Invest

Invest
1; 1

Not Invest 0; 1

Not Invest
1; 0
0; 0

G

Invest

Invest
1
p

1; p1

Not Invest 0; 1

Not Invest
1

1; 0
0; 0

where 0 < p < 1. Thus there is a dominant strategy to not invest in the bad state. There are
two strict Nash equilibria in the good state. If there is common certainty that the state is good,
invest is a best response for a player if and only if he thinks the other player will invest with
probability at least p.
We will characterize rationalizable behavior (for the two versions given above) on all type
spaces using belief operators. For the …xed type space, an event E is a subset of T

. Following
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Monderer and Samet (1989), we de…ne belief operators as follows. Write Bip (E) for set of types
of player i who believe event E with probability at least p, so
Bip (E) = ti 2 Ti

i

0

t0 i ;

j

ti ; t0

i

;

0

2 E jti

p :

Also de…ne everyone p-believes and common p-belief operators which map events in T
other events in T

to

:

B p (E) =
i=1;:::;I

Bip (E)

and C p (E) =

\

[B p ]n (E) .

n=1;2;:::

Write EG and EB for the set of states where the payo¤ state
EG = f(t; ) j =

Gg

is good and bad respectively, so

and EB = f(t; ) j =

Bg.

Now action "not invest" is always interim correlated rationalizable. Action "invest" is interim
correlated rationalizable for type ti of player i only if he p-believes that it is common p-belief
that the state is good, i.e., if ti 2 Bip (C p (EG )). This is a well known characterization.8
Now write Bi+ (E) for the set of types of player i that think that E is possible:
9
8
=
<
9t i 2 T i and 2 such that
= \ Bip (E)
Bi+ (E) = ti 2 Ti
p>0
;
:
((ti ; t i ) ; ) 2 E and i (t i ; jti ) > 0

We can de…ne everyone thinks possible and common possibility operators in the natural ways:
B + (E) =
i=1;:::;I

C + (E) =

\

Bi+ (E)
B+

n

(E)

n=1;2;:::

Action "not invest" is always belief-free rationalizable. Action "invest" is belief-free rationalizable for type ti of player i exactly if he thinks it is possible that there is common possibility that
the state is good, i.e., if ti 2 Bi+ (C + (EG )). Is this a strong or a weak condition? It is weak in
the sense that, at each level, only possibility is required. It is strong in the sense that we still
need in…nite levels (or a …xed point) to support investment.
To further understand this characterization, note that an event is possible for a player exactly
if he is certain of (i.e., assigns probability 1 to) its complement.
complement of event E, we have
Bi+ (E) =
8

Bi1 (

E) :

See Monderer and Samet (1989) and Kajii and Morris (1997).

Thus writing

E for the
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Now suppose that we de…ne an operator B 1 (E) corresponding to distributed certainty that E
is true, i.e., it corresponds to the event that someone is certain that E is true:
B 1 (E) = (t; ) ti 2 Bi1 (E) for some i
and say that there is iterated distributed certainty of event E if there is distributed certainty
of E, or there is distributed certainty that there is distributed certainty, or a further iterated
version of this statement is true. Thus
C 1 (E) =

[

n=1;2;:::

n

B1

(E) .

Now
B + (E) =

B1 (

E) .

Thus, by induction,
B+

n

(E) =

B1

C + (E) =

C1 (

n

(

E)

and so
E) .

Thus there is common possibility of event E if and only if there is not iterated distributed
certainty of not E. Thus invest is belief-free rationalizable if and only if there is not iterated
distributed certainty that the state is bad (i.e.,

B ).

We can also characterize belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibria in this game.

There is

clearly a belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium where each player i invests if he p-believes
that there is common p-belief of the good state, i.e., type ti invests whenever ti 2 Bip (C p (EG )).

Action "invest" is not interim correlated rationalizable for player i if ti 2
= Bip (C p (EG )). Thus
the "largest" belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium has players investing only on the
event C p (EG ). The structure of Bayes correlated equilibria is more subtle in this example; see
Bergemann and Morris (2014) for a discussion of the structure of Bayes correlated equilibria in
related contexts.
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Two Important Special Cases

4.1
If

Complete Information
is a singleton, then interim correlated rationalizability and belief-free rationalizability will

both reduce to (complete information) correlated rationalizability (Brandenburger and Dekel
(1987)); and belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium and Bayes correlated equilibrium reduce
to complete information (objective) correlated equilibrium (Aumann (1987)). In this sense, we
are looking at natural generalizations of the classical complete information literature results (at
least when they are given an "informational robustness" interpretation).

4.2

Payo¤ Type Spaces

Consider the special case where the payo¤ relevant states have a product structure, i.e.,
=

1

::::

2

and each player knows his own "payo¤ type"

i

2

i,

I

and nothing more. Thus we have Ti =

i.

This "naive" or "payo¤" type space is a particular example of a type space as used in the
preceding analysis. On this space, beliefs will reduce to

i

:

i

!

(

i ).

The de…nition of interim correlated rationalizability reduces as follows. Let ICRi0 ( i ) = Ai
and let ICRin+1 ( i ) equal the set of actions for which there exists
(1)

i (a i ;
i) > 0 )
X
(2)
i (a i ;
i) =
a

i

(3) ai 2 arg max
a0i

a

X
i;

j

i

2

(A

i

i)

such that

2 ICRjk ( j ) for each j 6= i
ij i)

i

(

i

(a i ;

for each
i ; ) ui

((a0i ; a i ) ; ( i ;

i ))

i

and let
ICRi ( i ) =

\

ICRin ( i ) .

n 1

In a payo¤ type environment, allowing correlation between others’types and payo¤ states makes
no di¤erence here, and this version of interim rationalizability has been widely used in (explicit
or implicit) payo¤ type environments (for example, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003a) and Dekel
and Wolinsky (2003)).
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Let BF Ei0 ( i ) = Ai and let

Belief-free rationalizability will now be de…ned as follows.
BF Ein+1 ( i ) equal the set of actions for which there exists

2

(A

i)

i

such that

(a i ; i ; ) > 0 ) aj 2 BF Ejn ( j ) for each j 6= i
X
(2)
(a i ; i ; ) > 0 ) i ( i j i ) > 0
(1)

a

i

(3) ai 2 arg max
a0i

a

X

(a i ;

i;

i ) ui

((a0i ; a i ) ; ( i ;

i ))

i

and let
BF Ei ( i ) =

\

BF Ein ( i ) .

n 1

A decision rule will now be a mapping

a

a

for all i,

i

2

i,

X
i;

X
i;

! A and will be obedient if

( i;

i)

((ai ; a i ) j ( i ;

i )) ui

((ai ; a i ) ; ( i ;

i ))

( i;

i)

((ai ; a i ) j ( i ;

i )) ui

((a0i ; a i ) ; ( i ;

i )) .

i

i

and ai ; a0i 2 Ai ; and belief invariant if
i

is independent of

:

i.

(ai j ( i ;

i ))

,

X
a

i

i

((ai ; a i ) j ( i ;

i ))

In this case, Bayes correlated equilibrium reduces to the Bayesian solution

of Forges (1993) and the belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium reduces to belief invariant
Bayesian solution of Forges (2006) and Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010).
Within payo¤ type spaces, we can consider two further restrictions in order to relate belief-free
rationalizability to existing approaches:
1. There are private values if ui ((ai ; a i ) ; ( i ;

i ))

is independent of

i.

Under the private

values assumption, the solution concept of belief-free rationalizability is that studied by
Chen, Micali, and Pass (2014b); Chen, Micali, and Pass (2014a) develop novel results about
robust revenue maximization using this solution concept.
2. The full (payo¤ type) support assumption is satis…ed if
i.

i

(

ij i)

> 0 for all i,

i

and

Under the full support assumption, restriction (2) in the de…nition of belief-free

rationalizability becomes redundant. We referred to this as "incomplete information rationalizability" in Bergemann and Morris (2008). This is the solution concept analyzed in
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much of our mechanism design work (Bergemann and Morris (2012)). Note that we did
not report beliefs over payo¤ types in our robust mechanism design work, but if we had,
they would be irrelevant to our analysis and we were implicitly assuming full support by
always allowing any payo¤ type pro…le of others to be associated with a given payo¤ type
of a player. We studied Bayes correlated equilibrium in this context in Bergemann and
Morris (2008) where we called it "incomplete information correlated equilibrium".

5

Informational Robustness Foundations of Four Solution
Concepts

Now suppose that we start out with type space T and we allow each player i to observe an
additional signal si 2 Si .

Each player i has a subjective belief

i

about the distribution of

signals conditional on the type pro…les and the payo¤ state:
i

5.1

:T

!

(S) :

Subjective Belief and the Support Assumption

We make the support assumption that, for all players i and ti 2 Ti , there exists S i (ti )
that
s

X

i ;t i;

i

((si ; s i ) j (ti ; t i ) ; )

i

(t i ; jti ) > 0

Si such
(1)

for each si 2 S i (ti ) and
j

((si ; s i ) jt; ) = 0

(2)

for all j 6= i, si 2
= S i (ti ), s i , t and . The interpretation is that if player i has type ti , there is
common certainty that he will observe an additional signal si 2 S i (ti ) and player i thinks that
every signal in S i (ti ) is possible. This support assumption ensures that whenever a player other
than i thinks that (ti ; si ) is possible, the beliefs of player i conditional on (ti ; si ) are well-de…ned
by Bayes rule. This assumption was implicit in the formulation of a correlating device in Liu
(2014). We brie‡y discuss in section 5.2 alternative ways of addressing this issue. We refer to
any (Si ;

I
i )i=1

satisfying the support restriction as an expansion of type space T . An expansion
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is payo¤-irrelevant if, for each player i,

s

X

i 2S i

i

((si ; s i ) j (ti ; t i ) ; )

(3)

is independent of (t i ; ). Liu (2014) has shown that this de…nition characterizes payo¤ irrelevance in the sense that players can observe signals without altering their beliefs and higher-order
beliefs about the state (see also Bergemann and Morris (2014)). Now a basic game G, a type
space T and an expansion (Si ;

I
i )i=1

jointly de…ne a game of incomplete information. A (pure)

strategy for player i in this game of incomplete information is a mapping

i

: Ti

Si ! Ai .9

is a (Bayes Nash) equilibrium if, for each player i, ti and si 2 S i (ti ), we

Now strategy pro…le
have

t

t

X

i

(t i ; jti )

i

(si ; s i j ((ti ; t i ) ; )) ui

i

(t i ; jti )

i

(si ; s i j ((ti ; t i ) ; )) ui

i ;s i ;

X

i ;s i ;

i

(ti ; si ) ;

ai ;

i

i

(4)

(t i ; s i ) ;

(t i ; s i ) ;

for all ai 2 Ai .
Now we have informational robustness foundations for the two rationalizability solution concepts we discussed:
Proposition 1 Action ai is interim correlated rationalizable for type ti of player i in (G; T )
if and only if there exists a payo¤-irrelevant expansion Sj ;
G; T ; Sj ;

I
j j=1

and a signal si 2 S i (ti ) such that

i

I
j j=1

of T , an equilibrium

of

(ti ; si ) = ai .

Versions of this observation appear as Proposition 2 in Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006)
and as Lemma 2 in Liu (2014).

For completeness, and for comparison with the next Propo-

sition, we report a proof in the Appendix for the Proposition under the current notation and
interpretation.
Proposition 2 Action ai is belief-free rationalizable for type ti of player i in (G; T ) if and only
if there exists an expansion Sj ;
si 2 S i (ti ) such that
9

i

I
j j=1

of T , an equilibrium

of G; T ; Sj ;

I
j j=1

and signal

(ti ; si ) = ai .

It is without loss of generality to focus on pure strategy pro…les for our results: if mixed strategies were

allowed, they could always be puri…ed with a richer expansion.
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Proof. Suppose that action ai is belief-free rationalizable for type ti in (G; T ).
de…nition of belief-free rationalizability, there exists, for each aj 2 BF Rj (tj ), a conjecture
(T

j

A

By the
aj ;tj
j

2

) such that

j

(1)
(2)

aj ;tj
j

X
a

(t j ; a j ; ) > 0 ) ak 2 BF Rk (tk ) for each k 6= j;
aj ;tj
j

(t j ; a j ; ) > 0 )

j

(3) aj 2 arg max
a0j

t

X

j ;a

Now consider the expansion Sj ;

aj ;tj
j

j

(t j ; jtj ) > 0 for each t j ; ; and

(t j ; a j ; ) uj

a0j ; a

.

;

j

j;

I
j j=1

and

of T , where Sj = Aj [ sj

:T

j

!

(S) is

given by

j

((sj ; s j ) j (tj ; t j ) ; ) =

for some " > 0.

8
>
>
>
>
<

sj ;tj
"
#BF Rj (tj ) j

j (t j ; jtj )
>
>
>
>
: 0, otherwise

(t j ; s j ; ) , if sj 2 BF Rj (tj ) and s j 2 BF R j (t j )
X s ;t
j j
(t j ; s j ; ) , if sj = sj and s j = s j
"
j
s

j 2A j

It is always possible to construct such an expansion for su¢ ciently small

" > 0 because of property (2) above. Now, by construction, there is an equilibrium of the game
G; T ; Sj ;

I
j j=1

where if sj 2 S j (tj ),

j

(tj ; sj ) = sj , and

tj ; sj can be arbitrarily set

j

equal to any element of
arg max
a0j

t

X

j

j ;a j

(t j ; jtj )

j

sj ; a j j ((tj ; t j ) ; ) uj

For the converse, suppose that there exists an expansion Sj ;
of G; T ; Sj ;

I
j j=1

a0j ; a

I
j j=1

j

;

of T and an equilibrium

. We will show inductively in n that, for all players j, aj 2 BF Rjn (tj )

whenever sj 2 S j (tj ) and

j

(tj ; sj ) = aj . It is true by construction for n = 0. Suppose that

it is true for n. Since sj 2 S j (tj ), equilibrium condition (4) implies that aj is a best response
to a conjecture over others’types and actions and the state. By the inductive hypothesis, this
conjecture assigns zero probability to type action pro…les (tj ; aj ) of player j where aj 2
= BF Rjn (tj ).
By construction, the marginal of this conjecture on T
of

j

j

has support contained in the support

( jtj ). Thus aj 2 BF Rjn+1 (tj ).

An expansion (Si ;

I
i )i=1

expanded game G; T ; (Si ;

satis…es the common prior assumption if
I
i )i=1

and a strategy pro…le

i

is independent of i. An

for that game will induce a decision

Informational Robustness December 15, 2014
rule

!

:T

(A):
(ajt; ) =

18
X

(sj (t; )) :

f(t;s): (t;s)=ag

Proposition 3 If T is a common prior type space, then

is a belief invariant Bayes correlated

equilibrium of (G; T ) if and only if there exists a payo¤-irrelevant common prior expansion
(Si ;

I
i )i=1

of T and equilibrium

of G; T ; (Si ;

I
i )i=1

such that

Proposition 4 If T is a common prior type space, then

is a Bayes correlated equilibrium of

(G; T ) if and only if there exists a common prior expansion (Si ;
G; T ; (Si ;

I
i )i=1

such that

induces .

I
i )i=1

of T and equilibrium

of

induces .

A subjective version of Proposition 3 appears in Liu (2014) (and the common prior case is
discussed in section 5.3). Proposition 4 appears as Theorem 2 in Bergemann and Morris (2014).

5.2

The Support Assumption and a Posteriori Equilibrium

In our de…nitions of expansions, we maintained the support assumption (see equations (1) and
(2) above).

This assumption is automatically satis…ed under the common prior assumption.

But what is the signi…cance of the support assumption for rationalizability results? If we simply
dropped the assumption, and did not replace it with any restriction, then any action could be
played in an equilibrium on some expansion of the type space, since it does not matter for ex ante
utility what action is played on a zero probability event. An intermediate assumption would be
to drop the support assumption, but to add to equilibrium condition (4) the requirement that
an action was a best response to some conjecture at signals that were assigned probability zero,
i.e., if
s

then there exists

i

2

X
i ;t

(T

t

t

i

i;

S

i

X

((si ; s i ) j (ti ; t i ) ; )
i

i

(t i ; jti ) = 0,

(5)

) such that

i

(t i ; s i ; ) ui

i

(ti ; si ) ;

i

(t i ; s i ; ) ui

ai ;

i

(t i ; s i ) ;

(6)

i ;s i ;

X
i ;s

i

(t i ; s i ) ;

i;

for all ai 2 Ai . But if we relaxed the support assumption to this intermediate assumption, the
resulting solution concept would no longer depend on the type space. In particular, say that
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an action is ex post rationalizable in basic game G if it survives an iterative deletion procedure
where, at each round, we delete actions which are not a best response given any conjecture over
surviving actions. Formally, let EP Ri0 = Ai , let EP Rin+1 be the set of actions for which there
exists

i

2

(A

i

) s.t.
(a i ; ) > 0 ) aj 2 EP Rjn for each j 6= i,
X
0
(2) ai 2 arg max
i (a i ; ) ui ((ai ; a i ) ; ) ;
(1)

i

a0i

a

i;

and let
EP Ri =

\

EP Rin .

n 1

So an action could be played in an expanded type space (whether or not (3) is satis…ed) if
and only if it is ex post rationalizable. Because the solution concept no longer depends on the
type space, we would have some counter-intuitive implications.

Consider a payo¤ type space

with private values, so that a player has a payo¤ type determining his private value on the
original type space. But because he observes a zero probability signal, we must allow him to
have any belief after observing unexpected signals, so he can conclude that his prior belief about
his private value was wrong. Our support assumption exactly rules out the possibility of players
observing zero probability signals and updating to beliefs outside their original support.
Interim correlated rationalizability, belief-free rationalizability and ex post rationalizability
all reduce to correlated rationalizability in complete information games. In fact, in the complete
information case, allowing players to assign zero probability to signals but requiring them to play
best responses to some conjecture is exactly the re…nement of subjective correlated equilibrium,
a posteriori equilibrium, introduced in Aumann (1974) and used in Brandenburger and Dekel
(1987). If we wanted to stay closer to the language of Aumann (1974) and Brandenburger and
Dekel (1987), we could de…ne a generalized, incomplete information, version of a posteriori equilibrium. If one imposed no new restrictions given the initial type space, we would characterize
ex post rationalizability; by imposing additional restrictions at zero probability events, we would
get back to belief-free rationalizability and interim correlated rationalizability.
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Epistemic Foundations of Four Solution Concepts

The purpose of this section is twofold.

First, we sketch how the "informational robustness"

Propositions 1 through 4 of the previous section can be mechanically re-interpreted as classic
epistemic results in the spirit of the classic works of Aumann (1987) and Brandenburger and
Dekel (1987).

Then, we discuss the limitations of these crude translations of our results in

the light of the modern epistemic foundations literature.

Our purpose in doing so is not to

provide novel epistemic foundations results but rather to see how some solution concepts that
we and others have worked with in economic applications, and their informational robustness
foundations, relate to the epistemic foundations literature.

6.1

Epistemic Type Spaces

We …x a basic game G = (Ai ; ui )Ii=1 which will implicitly be assumed to be commonly certain
among the players. Let each player have a …nite set of types
A type ! i 2

i

i

:

i

! Ti .

(! i ) 6= ti and

(

: Ti !

i

(((! i ; ! i ) ; ) jti ) = 0

X

i

(((! i ; ! i ) ; ) jti ) > 0

!

whenever

i

X

!

i

:

i

! Ai .

.
Let Ti

The interpretation is that ti 2 Ti is an arbitrary partial

description of player i’s type. Each player has a belief

i

The state space is thus

includes a description of the player’s action, given by

be a …nite set and let

whenever

i.

i;

i;

) satisfying

I
i )i=1

as an epistemic type space.
For a given epistemic type space, we describe some objects of interest. Let b i : i !
i

i

(! i ) = ti . We will refer to E = ( i ;

(

i ; Ti ;

i;

) be the induced belief of type ! i of player i over other players’types and the state:
b (! i ; j! i ) = X i (((! i ; ! i ) ; ) j i (! i ))
.
i
0
0
!
;
!
;
j
(!
)
i
i
i
i
i
!0 i ;

0

An epistemic type space also induces beliefs about partial descriptions of others’types,
(T

i

), where
i

(t i ; jti ) =

X

f!j (!)=tg;

i

(((! i ; ! i ) ; ) jti ) .

i

: Ti !
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, let Ci (E) be the set of player i’s types who are certain of event E, so
n
Ci (E) = ! i 2

i

o
b i (! i ; j! i ) > 0 ) ((! i ; ! i ) ; ) 2 E .

Let C (E) be the event where all players are certain of E, so
C (E) = f(!; ) 2

j! i 2 Ci (E) for each i g .

Let CC (E) corresponding to common certainty of E:
CC (E) =

\

C n (E) .

n 1

Let Rati be the set of player i’s types that are rational:
8
<
X
b (! i ; j! i ) ui ((ai ;
Rati = ! i 2 i i (! i ) 2 arg max
i
:
ai
!

i

(! i )) ; )

i;

Let Rat be the event where all players are rational, so
Rat = f(!; ) 2

9
=
;

:

j! i 2 Rati for each ig :

We now want to discuss players’ beliefs and higher-order beliefs about the states

.

We

omit the - by now, standard - construction of this space, following Mertens and Zamir (1985)
and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993).
T

(T )I

=

1

This (in…nite) space T

satis…es the homeomorphism

. Now there is a bijection between T

and the set of all beliefs and

higher-order beliefs about

. We are restricting attention to …nite type spaces. Thus we write

T for the set of types in T

that belong to a belief closed subset of T . We refer to an element

of t 2 T as a

-type, since it is a canonical description of the beliefs and higher-order beliefs

of a …nite type about
Now any type ! i 2
mapping
that

i

i

:

i

.
i

implicitly de…nes beliefs and higher-order beliefs about

! T describe the beliefs and higher-order beliefs of player i.

(! i ) is the

. Let the
We will say

-type of type ! i . We also de…ned a partial description of a player’s type,

ti 2 Ti and an associated belief about other players’partial types and states. Now partial type
ti 2 Ti also implicitly de…nes beliefs and higher-order beliefs about

, specifying beliefs about

conditional on type ti alone, beliefs about beliefs of others conditional on T
conditional on ti ; and so on. Let the mapping

i

i

alone, and

,

: Ti ! T describe the beliefs and higher-order
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beliefs of player i based on partial information. We will say that

i

( i (! i )) is the partial

-type

of type ! i .
Finally, recall that we de…ned solution concepts on arbitrary types spaces.

But each of

the four solution concepts we have discussed have the property that they are independent of
redundant types.
beliefs

Thus if we write T

:T !

(T )

rationalizable actions of a

I 1

for the type space consisting of I copies of T and

, the set of belief-free rationalizable and interim correlated

-type of player i in game (G; T ) are well-de…ned. And the set of

BIBCE and BCE decision rules de…ned on …nite belief-closed subsets of (T )I

are also well

de…ned.
Now we have the following re-statements of the four informational robustness Propositions
above:
Proposition 5 If there is common certainty of rationality, then all players are choosing interim
correlated rationalizable actions for their

-type; i.e.,

(!; ) 2 CC (Rat) )

i

(! i ) 2 ICRi (

i

(! i )) .

Conversely, if an action is interim correlated rationalizable for a

-type of player i, then there

exists an epistemic type space and a type of player i in that epistemic type space who takes that
action, has that

-type and is certain that there is common certainty of rationality; i.e.,

ai 2 ICRi (t ) ) 9E and ! i 2

i

such that

i

(! i ) = ai ,

i

(! i ) = t and ! i 2 Ci (CC (Rat)) .

Various "epistemic foundations" of interim correlated equilibrium have been presented in the
literature (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006), Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo, and Penta (2011)
and Liu (2014)). The above statement is closest to that of Theorem 11 of Dekel and Siniscalchi
(2014).
Proposition 6 If there is common certainty of rationality, then all players are choosing belieffree rationalizable actions for their partial
(!; ) 2 CC (Rat) )

-type; i.e.,
i

(! i ) 2 BF Ri ( i ( i (! i ))) .

Conversely, if an action is belief-free rationalizable for a

-type of player i, then there exists an

epistemic type space and a type of player i in that epistemic type space who takes that action,
has that partial

-type and is certain that there is common certainty of rationality; i.e.,

ai 2 BF Ei (t ) ) 9E and ! i 2

i

such that

i

(! i ) = ai ,

i

( i (! i )) = t and ! i 2 Ci (CC (Rat)) .

Informational Robustness December 15, 2014
An epistemic type space E = ( i ;

i ; Ti ;

23
I
i )i=1

i;

satis…es the common prior assumption if

there exists a common prior
2
such that

X

!0

i;

(

!i; !0

)

;

i

0

>0

0

for all i and ! i , and
i
i

((! i ; ! i ) ; ) = 0

(((! i ; ! i ) ; ) j i (! i )) =

X

f!0i j i (!0i )=

((! i ; ! i ) ; )
i

g;!0 i ;

i (! i )

! 0i ; ! 0

i

;

0

0

for all i, (! i ; ! i ) and .
Proposition 7 For any common prior epistemic type space, the implied decision rule as a function of

-types and states, conditional on common certainty of rationality, is a belief invariant

Bayes correlated equilibrium. Conversely, for any belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium,
there exists a common prior epistemic type space where there is common certainty of rationality and the implied decision rule as a function of

-types and states, conditional on common

certainty of rationality equals that belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium.
Proposition 8 For any common prior epistemic type space, the implied decision rule as a function of

-types and states, conditional on common certainty of rationality, is a Bayes correlated

equilibrium. Conversely, for any Bayes correlated equilibrium, there exists a common prior epistemic type space where there is common certainty of rationality and the implied decision rule as
a function of partial

-types and states, conditional on common certainty of rationality, equals

that Bayes correlated equilibrium.
Propositions 5 through 8 are re-writings of Propositions 1 through 4, with (i) di¤erent interpretations of the underlying objects; and (ii) restricting attention to type spaces without
redundant types.
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Discussion

Let us discuss a few of the ways in which these results are "old fashioned" and/or problematic.
1. As in the classical literature, we allowed players to hold beliefs about their own types,
i.e., their actions and their rationality. Following Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), we
could remove references to agents’beliefs over their own types. It would certainly imply
changes in language and, in some cases, such as in the incomplete information extensions of
the correlated equilibrium results of Dekel and Siniscalchi (2014), this would lead to novel
conceptual issues.
2. We assumed that player i has a belief conditional on his partial type ti and that, conditional
on type ti alone, he assigns strictly positive probability to every ! i with

i

(! i ) = ti . What

does this belief mean? One interpretation is that it is a counterfactual belief: what player
i would believe if he only remembered

i

(! i ) = ti and did not remember his true type.

For most of our analysis, this assumption does not matter and we could have been working
directly with b : i ! ( i
). But the assumption does matter for Proposition
i

6. We could work with alternative assumptions. We need to somehow associate a partial

type ti with a hierarchical belief type, but (for purposes of Proposition 6) we could de…ne
i

: Ti !

(T

i

) arbitrarily as long as

i

(! i ; j! i ) )

i

(

i

(! i ) ; j i (! i )) > 0.

But Proposition 6 is perhaps the weakest epistemic foundations result to the extent that
we are not comfortable with the interpretation of the belief

i

: Ti !

(

).

3. We did not impose structure on the epistemic type space and thus allowed distinctions between states which did not correspond to well de…ned statements in the model about beliefs
and higher-order beliefs about exogenous and endogenous variables. Recent works have
argued that we should not allow such distinctions; thus Brandenburger and Friedenberg
(2008) argue that "extrinsic uncertainty" should not be allowed and Battigalli, Di Tillio,
Grillo, and Penta (2011) argue that only events corresponding to "expressible" statements
should be allowed. Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2008) argue that - in the context of
complete information games - excluding extrinsic uncertainty leads to a slight re…nement of
correlated rationalizability as the characterization of the implications of common certainty
of rationality. Presumably, their approach could be extended to incomplete information
and this would similarly re…ne interim correlated rationalizability.

Battigalli, Di Tillio,
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Grillo, and Penta (2011) instead enrich the language, by adding explicit signals, to make
more statements expressible in the language, and provide expressible epistemic foundations
for interim correlated rationalizability.
4. Propositions 7 and 8, like Aumann (1987), show that common certainty of rationality implies the play of a correlated equilibrium. But these results prove implications of common
certainty of rationality under the common prior. Thus they rely on an ex ante interpretation of the prior. But epistemic models are usual assumed to be about interim beliefs,
and since Aumann (1987), we have elegant characterizations of what it means for a particular type to have beliefs and higher-order beliefs consistent with the common prior (Samet
(1998) and Feinberg (2000)). Dekel and Siniscalchi (2014) report an alternative epistemic
foundation for correlated equilibrium - in the context of incomplete information games which takes an interim perspective and avoids discussing a player’s belief about his own
action. One could presumably extend their approach to incomplete information to give
epistemic foundations for belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium.
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Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that action ai is interim correlated rationalizable for type ti
in (G; T ). By the de…nition of interim correlated rationalizability, there exists, for each player
aj ;tj
j

j and aj 2 ICRj (tj ), a conjecture
(1)
(2)

aj ;tj
j

X
a

aj ;tj
j

(t j ; a j ; ) =

j

a0j

Now consider the expansion Sj ;

whenever

j

(T

j

A

j

) s.t.

(t j ; a j ; ) > 0 ) ak 2 ICRk (tk ) for each k 6= j;

(3) aj 2 arg max

j

2

t

X

j ;a

I
j j=1

j

aj ;tj
j

(t j ; jtj ) for each t j ; ; and

(t j ; a j ; ) uj

a0j ; a

;

j

.

j;

of T , where Sj = Aj and

((aj ; a j ) j (tj ; t j ) ; ) =

8
<
:

aj ;tj
(t j ;a j ;
j
j (t j ;

)
,
jtj ) #ICRj (tj )

0

j

:T

!

(S) satis…es

if a 2 ICR (t) ;
if

otherwise;

(t j ; jtj ) > 0. Now, by construction, there is an equilibrium of the game (G; T ; Sj ;

where
j

(tj ; aj ) = aj

for all j, tj and aj 2 ICRj (tj ).
For the converse, suppose that there exists an expansion Sj ;
(G; T ; Sj ;
j

I
j j=1 ).

I
j j=1

of T , an equilibrium

of

We will show inductively in n that, for all players j, aj 2 ICRjn (tj ) whenever

(tj ; sj ) = aj for some sj 2 S j (tj ).

It is true by construction for n = 0.

Suppose that it

is true for n. Equilibrium condition (4) implies that aj is a best response to a conjecture over
others’types and actions and the state. By the inductive hypothesis, this conjecture assigns zero
probability to type action pro…le (tk ; ak ) of player k 6= j with ak 2
= ICRkn (tk ). By construction,
the marginal on T

j

is equal to

j

( jtj ). Thus aj 2 ICRjn+1 (tj ).

I
j j=1 )
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